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The Computation of Pairwise Stable Networks
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Abstract
One of the most important stability concepts for network formation is pairwise sta-
bility. We develop a homotopy algorithm that is effective in computing pairwise stable
networks for a generic network formation problem. To do so, we reformulate the con-
cept of pairwise stability as a Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game played by the
links in the network and adapt the linear tracing procedure for non-cooperative games to
the network formation problem. As a by-product of our main result, we obtain that the
number of pairwise stable networks is generically odd. We apply the algorithm to the
connections model.
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1 Introduction
Networks are at the forefront of research in economics, operations research, and computer
science as powerful tools to model social and economic interactions. A network consists of
a finite set of nodes, representing agents, and a set of links, representing relationships be-
tween these agents. This paper considers the situation where agents make strategic decisions
regarding the formation of links.
In network formation theory, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduced the widely used
concept of pairwise stability, see in particular Bloch and Jackson (2006), Calvó-Armengol and
İlkılıç (2009), and Miyauchi (2016). A network is pairwise stable if for any pair of agents
that is connected neither of them benefits from deleting their link and for any pair of agents
that is not connected at least one of them loses from creating the link. Compared with Nash
equilibrium, pairwise stability has both cooperative and non-cooperative aspects: Link deletion
is a unilateral decision, whereas it requires the consent of both agents to establish a link.
Most of the literature considers unweighted networks, where each pair of agents is ei-
ther linked or not. Recently, Bich and Morhaim (2020) study a weighted version, where the
strength of each link is measured by a continuous variable. Agents can unilaterally decide to
decrease the link strength, whereas it requires the consent of both agents to increase it. Bich
and Morhaim (2020) prove that pairwise stable networks exist if all agents have quasi-concave
and continuous utility functions. This is an important contribution as in unweighted networks,
strong conditions are needed to guarantee the existence of pairwise stable networks, see Jack-
son and Watts (2001), Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007), and Hellmann (2013).
Further progress in this research program can be made by developing methods to solve
strategic network formation problems numerically. For unweighted networks where many
agents have dominant strategies, Leung (2020) develops an algorithm which makes it possible
to decompose the network of interest into smaller subnetworks. For the subnetworks, pairwise
stable networks are found by exhaustive search. The algorithm of Leung (2020) exploits the
sparse structure of the problem and has attractive complexity properties.
This paper is the first to develop an effective method to compute pairwise stable networks
in the general case. We assume that agents have multi-linear payoff functions, which enables
us to interpret the model of Bich and Morhaim (2020) as the mixed strategy version of the
model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
Apart from existence issues, pairwise stability also suffers from multiplicity problems. For
given payoff functions, there can be many pairwise stable networks. It is therefore essential to
pay attention to the way a pairwise stable network is selected. In non-cooperative game theory,
multiplicity of Nash equilibrium is a real concern (von Stengel, 1999; McLennan, 2005). The
linear tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) addresses the equilibrium selection
problem by formulating a process that transforms agents’ prior beliefs into equilibrium beliefs.
For normal-form games, the Nash equilibrium selected by the linear tracing procedure can be
computed by the homotopy algorithm of Herings and Peeters (2001). This work has been
extended to stochastic games in Herings and Peeters (2004) and Li and Dang (2020). It is also
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closely related to the global Newton method as developed in Govindan and Wilson (2003) for
normal-form games and Govindan and Wilson (2009) for stochastic games.
Our algorithm adapts the linear tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) to select
a pairwise stable network. To do so, we reformulate the network formation problem as a
non-cooperative game played by the links. Then, we apply the linear tracing procedure to
this auxiliary game. The auxiliary game features robust non-differentiabilities and is therefore
outside the class of normal-form games that has been considered in the literature so far. We
show that for a generic network formation problem, there is a unique path that transforms
arbitrary prior beliefs of agents to beliefs that are compatible with a pairwise stable network.
As a by-product of our convergence proof, we obtain the result that for a generic network
formation problem the number of pairwise stable networks is odd.
As a final result, we show how a suitably chosen transformation of variables makes it
possible to obtain the path in the auxiliary game as the solution to an everywhere differentiable
homotopy. Our algorithm therefore belongs to the class of differentiable homotopy methods.
These methods are both useful to compute equilibria in general equilibrium models, see Eaves
and Schmedders (1999) for an overview, and to compute equilibria in various classes of non-
cooperative games, see Herings and Peeters (2010) for a survey. This paper is the first to apply
homotopy algorithms to network formation problems, problems that have non-cooperative as
well as cooperative features.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the network formation problem
and the concept of pairwise stability. Section 3 introduces the linear tracing procedure for
networks problems, Section 4 establishes that it is feasible and generically well-defined, and
Section 5 transforms it into an everywhere differentiable homotopy. Section 6 presents an
example involving the connections model. Section 7 describes the numerical implementation
for the connections model. Section 8 presents a short conclusion.
2 Pairwise Stable Networks
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the finite set of agents. The network relations among them are
represented by an undirected graph, where the nodes represent the agents and the links stand
for pairwise relations. Let L = {(i, j) ∈ N × N |i < j} be the set of links. For ease of
notation, we use ij instead of (i, j) to denote the link between nodes i and j.
An unweighted network on N corresponds to a binary vector g ∈ {0, 1}L. For each link
ij ∈ L, gij = 1 if i and j are connected and gij = 0 otherwise. For every ij ∈ L, for every
s ∈ {0, 1}, g′ = (s, g−ij) denotes the network such that g′k` = gk` for every k` 6= ij and
g′ij = s. Let G = {0, 1}L be the set of all possible unweighted networks and, for every ij ∈ L,
let G−ij = {0, 1}L\{ij} be the set of all possible unweighted networks without taking link ij
into consideration.
Agent i ∈ N has a payoff function vi : G → R. We denote the tuple of payoff functions
of all agents by v = (vi)i∈N .
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In their seminal paper, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduce the following notion of
stability.1
Definition 1 (Strictly pairwise stable unweighted network). An unweighted network g ∈ G is
strictly pairwise stable with respect to v if, for every ij ∈ L,
1. if gij = 1, then vi(0, g−ij) ≤ vi(g) and vj(0, g−ij) ≤ vj(g),
2. if gij = 0, then vi(1, g−ij) > vi(g) implies vj(1, g−ij) < vj(g).
Strict pairwise stability incorporates that link deletion is a unilateral decision, whereas it
requires the consent of both agents to establish a link. Moreover, to form a link, it is sufficient
that one agent strictly benefits from doing so, whereas the other agent might be indifferent.
This is somewhat different from the usual assumption in cooperative game theory, where for
a coalition to deviate, all its members should strictly benefit. In Section 5 of Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996), the authors also discuss a weaker notion of stability, which we call pairwise
stability. This notion requires that if gij = 0 for some link ij ∈ L, then vi(1, g−ij) > vi(g)
implies vj(1, g−ij) ≤ vj(g).
In this paper, we follow Bich and Morhaim (2020) and go beyond unweighted networks.
We represent each link ij ∈ L by a real number xij ∈ [0, 1]. As argued in Bich and Morhaim
(2020), it is natural to quantify the weight of a relationship in a continuous way. The weight
can measure intensity, level of confidence, geographical distance, and so on. In this paper, we
interpret xij as the probability that link ij forms.
Let ∆(G) = [0, 1]L be the set of all possible networks and, for every ij ∈ L, let ∆(G−ij) =
[0, 1]L\{ij} be the set of all possible networks without taking link ij into consideration. Given










(xijgij + (1− xij)(1− gij)).




(gijxij + (1− gij)(1− xij)).
We denote the tuple of payoff functions of all agents by u = (ui)i∈N .
Bich and Morhaim (2020) extend the definition of pairwise stability for unweighted net-
works to networks in ∆(G) in the following way.
Definition 2 (Pairwise stable networks). A network x ∈ ∆(G) is pairwise stable with respect
to u if, for every ij ∈ L,
1In the terminology of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), this is called a pairwise stable network.
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1. for every s ∈ [0, xij), ui(s, x−ij) ≤ ui(x) and uj(s, x−ij) ≤ uj(x),
2. for every s ∈ (xij, 1], ui(s, x−ij) > ui(x) implies uj(s, x−ij) ≤ uj(x).
That is, x is pairwise stable if there are no two agents that can gain from strengthening their
connection and there is no single agent that can gain by weakening it. The idea is that a single
agent sufficies to weaken a link, but consent of both agents is required in order to strengthen
it.
When each component of x is required to be equal to zero or one, the notion of pairwise
stable network reverts to the one of pairwise stable unweighted network.2
We use a tuple W = 〈N,∆(G), (ui)i∈N〉 to represent a network formation problem involv-
ing the agents in N. The set of all network formation problems with set of agents N is denoted
byW . For every W ∈ W , we use PS(W ) to denote the set of pairwise stable networks of W.
Theorem 2 in Bich and Morhaim (2020) establishes that for every W ∈ W , a pairwise stable
network exists, so PS(W ) 6= ∅.
3 The Linear Tracing Procedure for Networks
In this section, we reformulate the concept of pairwise stability as a Nash equilibrium of a non-
cooperative game, where the agents in the game correspond to the links in the network. Next,
we use the linear tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) to select a Nash equilibrium
in this game, which therefore corresponds to selecting a pairwise stable network in the network
formation problem.
Lemma 1 reformulates the inequalities in Definition 2.










+ αij − βij = 0, ij ∈ L, (2)
αijxij = 0, ij ∈ L, (3)
βij(1− xij) = 0, ij ∈ L. (4)
Proof. (⇒)
Let x ∈ PS(W ).
For every ij ∈ L, it holds that ui(s, x−ij) is affine in s ∈ [0, 1], so ∂∂xij u
i(x) is well-defined.
Condition 1 of Definition 2 implies that, for every ij ∈ L such that xij > 0, ∂∂xij u
i(x) ≥ 0 and
∂
∂xij




uj(x)} ≥ 0. Condition 2 of Definition 2 implies that, for








We define αij = −min{ ∂∂xij u
i(x), ∂
∂xij
uj(x)} and βij = 0. If xij ∈ (0, 1), then the previous




uj(x)} = 0. We define αij = βij = 0. If xij = 1,
2As observed in endnote 14 of Bich and Morhaim (2020), this equivalence does not hold when instead of
being linear, utilities are only required to be quasi-concave in xij .
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uj(x)} ≥ 0. We define αij = 0 and




It is easily verified that (x, α, β) ∈ [0, 1]L × RL+ × RL+ yields a solution to (2)–(4).
(⇐)
Let (x, α, β) ∈ [0, 1]L × RL+ × RL+ be a solution to (2)–(4).




uj(x)} < 0, then αij, βij ≥ 0 and (2) imply αij > 0, so
xij = 0 by (3), and next βij = 0 by (4). If min{ ∂∂xij u
i(x), ∂
∂xij
uj(x)} > 0, then αij, βij ≥ 0
and (2) imply βij > 0, so xij = 1 by (4), and αij = 0 by (3). We conclude that
xij =
{











Since ui and uj are multi-linear functions, we have, for every s ∈ [0, 1],
ui(s, x−ij) = u
i(x) + (s− xij) ∂∂xij u
i(x),
uj(s, x−ij) = u
j(x) + (s− xij) ∂∂xij u
j(x).
(6)









By (6), we have that ui(s, x−ij) ≤ ui(x). The same argument shows that uj(s, x−ij) ≤ uj(x).





uj(x)} ≤ 0. By (6), we have that ui(s, x−ij) ≤ ui(x) or uj(s, x−ij) ≤
uj(x). Now ui(s, x−ij) > ui(x) implies uj(s, x−ij) ≤ uj(x) as desired.
Since Conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 2 hold, it follows that x is a pairwise stable network.
We now derive a closed-form solution for the partial derivatives of the utility function. For








(2gij − 1)πg−ij(x−ij)vi(g), (7)
where the choice of s ∈ [0, 1] is irrelevant since ui(s, x−ij) is affine in s. Note that the
coefficient 2gij − 1 is equal to 1 if gij = 1 and equal to −1 if gij = 0. The function
f jij : [0, 1]
L\{ij} → R is defined analogously. Let fij : [0, 1]L\{ij} → R be defined as the
minimum of f iij and f
j
ij, so
fij(x−ij) = min{f iij(x−ij), f
j
ij(x−ij)}, x−ij ∈ [0, 1]L\{ij}.
Conditions (2)–(4) of Lemma 1 correspond to the first-order condition of the problem
xij ∈ arg max
s∈[0,1]
sfij(x−ij), ij ∈ L. (8)
Therefore, the problem of finding a pairwise stable network of W is equivalent to the problem
of finding a Nash equilibrium of the game with set of agents L, each agent ij ∈ L having
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two pure strategies, corresponding to forming a link or not, and payoff functions given by
the objective in (8). We denote this game by Γ(W ) = 〈L, (fij)ij∈L〉 . The next corollary
summarizes our findings so far.
Corollary 1. Let W ∈ W . It holds that x ∈ PS(W ) if and only if x is a Nash equilibrium of
the game Γ(W ).
The equivalence between pairwise stability and Nash equilibrium motivates us to exploit
methods used in non-cooperative game theory for computing and selecting Nash equilibria
and develop an effective approach for finding pairwise stable networks. More precisely, we
adapt the linear tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) to select a pairwise stable
network in a network formation problem. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) consider finite games
and Herings and Peeters (2004) extend the linear tracing procedure to finite stochastic games.
The game Γ(W ) belongs to neither of these classes. The non-differentiabilities caused by the
minimum operator in the definition of fij poses new challenges that have to be taken care of.
The linear tracing procedure models a process by which agents update their beliefs. When
formulated in terms of our network formation problem, the agents start out from common
prior beliefs p ∈ ∆(G) and optimize against this common prior, leading to best responses
x ∈ ∆(G). If x happens to be equal to p, then the initial beliefs are confirmed, the prior beliefs
constitute a Nash equilibrium, and the process of updating beliefs stops. But usually, x 6= p
and agents update their prior beliefs by giving a weight 1− t to the initial prior beliefs and t to
the best response x, for t close to 0. This leads to a new prior belief (1− t)p+ tx against which
optimization takes place. This process of belief adaptation continues until a Nash equilibrium
is found.
More formally, for every t ∈ [0, 1], let W t be the network formation problem such that
with probability t the agents have utility functions as in W and with probability 1 − t they
are playing against the prior p ∈ ∆(G). The expected payoff of forming link ij ∈ L with
probability xij is then given by
tui(x) + (1− t)ui(xij, p−ij).
At t = 0, this expression equals ui(xij, p−ij). That is, when determining xij, agent i assumes
that the probabilities in the rest of the network are given by p−ij . It is clear that W 0 is a trivial
network formation problem without strategic interaction. The problem W 1 coincides with the
original network formation problem W.
The linear tracing procedure is designed such that it links a pairwise stable network of W 0
to a pairwise stable network of W 1. The set of all pairwise stable networks related to W t,
t ∈ [0, 1], is denoted by
L (W, p) =
{
(t, x) ∈ [0, 1]×∆(G)
∣∣∣x ∈ PS(W t)}.
We can apply Lemma 1 to W t. For every ij ∈ L, let F iij : [0, 1]× [0, 1]L\{ij} → R denote the
partial derivative of tui(x) + (1− t)ui(xij, p−ij) with respect to xij, that is
F iij(t, x−ij) = tf
i
ij(x−ij) + (1− t)f iij(p−ij).
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The function F jij : [0, 1] × [0, 1]L\{ij} → R is defined analogously. Let Fij : [0, 1] ×
[0, 1]L\{ij} → R be defined by
Fij(t, x−ij) = min{F iij(t, x−ij), F
j
ij(t, x−ij)}, (t, x−ij) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]L\{ij}. (9)
We immediately obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Let W ∈ W . For every t ∈ [0, 1], it holds that x ∈ PS(W t) if and only if there
exists α, β ∈ RL+ such that
Fij(t, x−ij) + αij − βij = 0, ij ∈ L,
αijxij = 0, ij ∈ L,
βij(1− xij) = 0, ij ∈ L,
if and only if
xij ∈ arg max
s∈[0,1]
sFij(t, x−ij), ij ∈ L,
if and only if x is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ(W t) = 〈L, (Fij(t, ·))ij∈L〉 .
4 The Structure of the Linear Tracing Procedure
The linear tracing procedure is said to be feasible if there exists a path in L (W, p) connecting a
pairwise stable network of W 0 to a pairwise stable network of W 1. It is said to be well-defined
if the path is uniquely determined, which implies that a unique pairwise stable network of W
is selected.
The theorem below claims that the linear tracing procedure is feasible for all network
formation problems.
Theorem 1. For every W ∈ W , the linear tracing procedure is feasible.
Proof. Let W ∈ W and t ∈ [0, 1]. By Corollary 2 it holds that x ∈ PS(W t) if and only if
xij ∈ arg max
s∈[0,1]
sFij(t, x−ij), ij ∈ L.
We define the correspondence ϕ : [0, 1]×∆(G)→ ∆(G) by
ϕ(t, x) = {x̂ ∈ ∆(G) | for every ij ∈ L, x̂ij ∈ arg max
s∈[0,1]
sFij(t, x−ij)},
so x ∈ ϕ(t, x) if and only if (t, x) ∈ L (W, p). The well-known maximum theorem implies
that ϕ is upper hemi-continuous. It is clear that ∆(G) is a non-empty, compact, and convex
set. From Mas-Colell’s fixed point theorem (Mas-Colell, 1974), the set of fixed points T =
{(t, x) ∈ [0, 1]×∆(G) | x ∈ ϕ(t, x)} contains a component T c such that ({0}×∆(G))∩T c 6=
∅ and ({1} ×∆(G)) ∩ T c 6= ∅.
Since L (W, p) is a set that can be described by a finite number of polynomial inequalities,
it is a semi-algebraic set and all its components are also path-connected, so any two points in
a component can be joined by a path, see Schanuel, Simon, and Zame (1991). It follows that
the linear tracing procedure is feasible.
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We show next that for a typical network formation problem, the linear tracing procedure
is well-defined. To make this statement rigorous, we decompose L (W, p) into differentiable
pieces. Non-differentiabilities occur when xij changes along the path from 0 to a positive
probability or vice versa and when 1 − xij changes from 0 to a positive probability or vice
versa. For every ij ∈ L, define the set Sij = {s0ij, s1ij}. The meaning of s0ij is that the best
choice is not to form link ij, whereas s1ij indicates that it is optimal to create link ij. Let
S = ∪ij∈LSij. A set B ⊂ S is called admissible if, for every ij ∈ L, B ∩ Sij 6= ∅. The
collection of all admissible subsets B of S is denoted by B.
An additional non-differentiability occurs because the payoff function Fij = min{F iij, F
j
ij}
is non-differentiable. Let C : L→ N be a function such that, for every ij ∈ L, C(ij) ∈ {i, j}.
The function C chooses for each link ij ∈ L an agent C(ij) such that the minimal value of
Fij is attained by F
C(ij)
ij . The collection of all such functions C is denoted by C.
We use pairs (B,C) ∈ B × C to decompose L (W, p) into subsets L (W, p,B,C) that are
differentiable manifolds with boundary. Formally, L (W, p,B,C) is given by
L (W, p,B,C) =
{
(t, x) ∈ L (W, p)
∣∣∣ ∀ij ∈ L,
C(ij) = i⇒ F iij(t, x−ij) ≤ F
j
ij(t, x−ij),
C(ij) = j ⇒ F jij(t, x−ij) ≤ F iij(t, x−ij),
s1ij /∈ B ⇒ xij = 0,
s0ij /∈ B ⇒ xij = 1,
s1ij ∈ B ⇒ Fij(t, x−ij) ≥ 0,




L (W, p) = ∪(B,C)∈B×CL (W, p,B,C).
For every (B,C) ∈ B × C, we define O(W, p,B,C) as the set of solutions (t, x, α, β) ∈
R× RL × RL × RL to the following system of equalities and inequalities.
F iij(t, x−ij) + αij − βij = 0, ij ∈ L, C(ij) = i, (10)
F jij(t, x−ij) + αij − βij = 0, ij ∈ L, C(ij) = j, (11)
xij = 0, s
1
ij /∈ B, (12)
xij − 1 = 0, s0ij /∈ B, (13)
βij = 0, s
0
ij ∈ B, (14)
αij = 0, s
1
ij ∈ B, (15)
F jij(t, x−ij)− F iij(t, x−ij) ≥ 0, C(ij) = i, (16)
F iij(t, x−ij)− F
j
ij(t, x−ij) ≥ 0, C(ij) = j, (17)
1− xij ≥ 0, s0ij ∈ B, (18)
xij ≥ 0, s1ij ∈ B, (19)
αij ≥ 0, s1ij /∈ B, (20)
βij ≥ 0, s0ij /∈ B, (21)
t ≥ 0, (22)
−t+ 1 ≥ 0. (23)
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Theorem 2. Let (W, p) ∈ W×∆(G). For every (B,C) ∈ B×C, the sets L (W, p,B,C) and
O(W, p,B,C) are C∞ diffeomorphic.
Proof. Let (B,C) ∈ B × C. Define the function ϕ : [0, 1] × ∆(G) → R × RL × RL × RL
by ϕ(t, x) = (t, x, α, β), where, for every ij ∈ L, αij = 0 if s1ij ∈ B, αij = −F
C(ij)
ij (t, x−ij)
if s1ij /∈ B, βij = 0 if s0ij ∈ B, and βij = F
C(ij)
ij (t, x−ij) if s
0
ij /∈ B. It holds that ϕ is a C∞
diffeomorphism such that ϕ(t, x) ∈ O(W, p,B,C) if and only if (t, x) ∈ L (W, p,B,C).
From Theorem 2 it follows that the structural properties of L (W, p,B,C) coincide with
those of O(W, p,B,C).
A network formation problem W ∈ W is completely determined by the tuple of utility
functions v, which can be represented by a vector in Rn2|L| . The standard topology and mea-
sure on Rn2|L| therefore induce a topology and measure on network formation problems. The
analysis of the system of equations and inequalities in (10)–(23) provides the following result.
Theorem 3. For an open set (W, p) ∈ W × ∆(G) with full Lebesgue measure, for every
(B,C) ∈ B×C, the set L (W, p,B,C) is a compact 1-dimensional C∞ manifold with bound-
ary. A boundary point (t, x) of L (W, p,B,C) is:
(i) Either a boundary point of exactly one L (W, p,B′, C) with B′ 6= B. Moreover, B and
B′ differ in exactly one element.
(ii) Or a boundary point of exactly one L (W, p,B,C ′) with C ′ 6= C. Moreover, C and C ′
are identical up to one element.
(iii) Or an element of {0, 1} ×∆(G).
Proof. See Appendix.
This theorem implies that, for almost every W and p, for all pairs (B,C) ∈ B × C, the set
L (W, p,B,C) consists of a finite number of smooth arcs and loops, see Mas-Colell (1985).
Theorem 3 does not claim that the set L (W, p,B,C) is non-empty. Since by definition the
empty set qualifies as a k-dimensional manifold for any k, a 1-dimensional manifold with
boundary may be empty.
Herings and Peeters (2001) develop a homotopy to compute the Nash equilibrium selected
by the tracing procedure for finite normal-form games. The application of the tracing proce-
dure to network formation problems involves two main differences. First, there is the non-
differentiability of Fij, which we tackle by the introduction of the choice function C. Second,
the perturbation argument that is needed to prove genericity is significantly more involved,
caused by the fact that the utility of forming a link potentially depends on the payoffs of all
2|L|−1 networks where that link is present.
If L (W, p,B,C) has a boundary point in (0, 1) × ∆(G), then there is a unique pair
(B′, C ′) ∈ B × C such that L (W, p,B′, C ′) and L (W, p,B,C) share this boundary point.
The uniqueness of (B′, C ′) implies that the sets L (W, p,B,C) and L (W, p,B′, C ′) are nicely
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linked to each other. Generically, it does not happen that three sets have a common boundary
point, nor does it happen that a boundary point of one set intersects the interior of another set.
If L (W, p,B,C) has a boundary point in {0, 1} ×∆(G), then this point does not belong
to any other set L (W, p,B′, C ′). This implies that such a boundary point is also a boundary
point of L (W, p).
Formally, the structure of L (W, p) is as follows.
Theorem 4. For an open set (W, p) ∈ W ×∆(G) with full Lebesgue measure, L (W, p) is a
compact 1-dimensional piecewise C∞ manifold with boundary. The boundary of L (W, p) is
given by the intersection of L (W, p) and {0, 1} ×∆(G). There is a unique boundary point in
{0} ×∆(G).
Proof. The first part of this theorem follows from Theorem 3 and the door-in door-out principle
as described in Lemke and Howson (1964). For the second part, notice that (0, x) ∈ L (W, p)
if and only if, for every ij ∈ L, xij ∈ arg maxs∈[0,1] sFij(0, p−ij). If there would be more
than one optimal solution, then there is ij ∈ L such that both xij = 0 and xij = 1 solves the
problem maxs∈[0,1] sFij(0, p−ij). This leads to a contraction with Theorem 3.
Generically, the set L (W, p) consists of a finite number of arcs and loops. Although it is
not necessarily the case that these arcs and loops are smooth, the number of non-differentiabilities
is finite at most. Theorem 3 implies that all arcs in L (W, p) start and end in {0, 1} ×∆(G).
Each such path consists of a finite sequence of smooth arcs of the sets L (W, p,B,C).
Generically, there is exactly one point of L (W, p) that belongs to {0}×∆(G). This point
is a boundary point of L (W, p,B,C), where B contains exactly one member for each link
ij ∈ L. It holds that s0ij ∈ B if given prior beliefs p it is optimal not to form a link and s1ij ∈ B
if it is optimal to create a link. It holds that C(ij) = i if f iij(p−ij) < f
j
ij(p−ij) and C(ij) = j
if f jij(p−ij) < f
i
ij(p−ij). By Theorem 4 this point is the starting point of a uniquely defined arc
of L (W, p). This arc is the unique feasible path of L (W, p) that transforms prior beliefs into
beliefs that correspond with a pairwise stable network.
Corollary 3. For an open set (W, p) ∈ W × ∆(G) with full Lebesgue measure, the linear
tracing procedure is well-defined.
The set L (W, p)∩ ({1}×∆(G)) consists of all pairwise stable networks of W . Precisely
one of these pairwise stable networks is an element of the unique feasible path of L (W, p).
The remaining pairwise stable networks are pairwise connected by arcs from L (W, p), so the
number of pairwise stable networks is odd.
Corollary 4. For an open set (W, p) ∈ W ×∆(G) with full Lebesgue measure, the number of
pairwise stable networks is odd.
The generic oddness of the number of Nash equilibria in normal-form games is a well-
known result of Harsanyi (1973). The existence of a pairwise stable network is a recent result
of Bich and Morhaim (2020). Corollary 4 shows that when agents have linear payoff functions,
Bich and Morhaim’s result can be sharpened to generic oddness.
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5 A Differentiable Approach
A potential drawback of the method of Section 4 is that one has to check whether a boundary
point of L (W, p,B,C) is reached, and if yes, one has to switch to a different system of
equalities defined by another pair (B′, C ′). This switching can be a serious problem in terms of
computation time. There are
∏
ij∈L(2
2− 1) = 3|L| different sets B and 2|L| different functions
C, whereas each one of them may be generated several times in the course of the algorithm.
We show next that switching can be avoided by choosing an appropriate transformation of
variables which results in an everywhere differentiable homotopy.
Let ij ∈ L. The constraints in (10)–(11) and (16)–(17) originate from the non-differentiability
of Fij = min{F iij, F
j
ij} as defined in (9). We can avoid the min operator by observing that
Fij(t, x−ij) = min
s∈[0,1]
sF iij(t, x−ij) + (1− s)F
j
ij(t, x−ij), (t, x−ij) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]L\{ij}.
The KKT conditions of this problem imply that σiij ∈ [0, 1] is a solution if and only if there





F iij(t, x−ij)− F
j
ij(t, x−ij) + µ
j


















We can therefore replace the constraints in (10)–(11) and (16)–(17) by (24) and
σiijF
i




ij(t, x−ij) + αij − βij = 0.
To obtain a differentiable homotopy, we introduce a transformation of variables, which is also
used in Garcia and Zangwill (1981). For κ = (κiij, κ
j
ij)ij∈L ∈ R2L and λ = (λ0ij, λ1ij)ij∈L ∈
R2L, we define








xij(λ) = (max{λ1ij, 0})2, αij(λ) = (max{−λ1ij, 0})2,
yij(λ) = (max{λ0ij, 0})2, βij(λ) = (max{−λ0ij, 0})2.
After making these transformations of variables, we can use Theorem 2 to conclude that





and λ1ij ∈ R such that
σiij(κ)F
i




ij(t, x−ij(λ)) + αij(λ)− βij(λ) = 0,
F iij(t, x−ij(λ))− F
j
ij(t, x−ij(λ)) + µ
j
ij(κ)− µiij(κ) = 0,
σiij(κ) + σ
j
ij(κ)− 1 = 0,
xij(λ) + yij(λ)− 1 = 0.
(25)
Notice that all inequalities have disappeared and that the same system of equalities can be







ij, xij, yij, αij, and βij as functions of κ and λ.
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Let H : [0, 1] × R2L × R2L → R4L be the homotopy defined by the left-hand side of
equalities (25). The homotopy H is continuously differentiable. It has the salient feature that
its zeros describe the linear tracing procedure. Indeed, it holds that (t, κ, λ) ∈ H −1({0}) if
and only if (t, x(λ)) ∈ L (W, p).
The structure of H −1({0}) is even simpler than the one of L (W, p) as the arcs and loops
in H −1({0}) are differentiable everywhere. The transformation of variables has smoothed
out the kinks. As a direct consequence, it is possible to calculate the derivative at each point of
the feasible path, which makes it possible to follow the path by means of easily implementable
numerical methods.
6 An Example for the Connections Model
We apply our method to the connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and illustrate
how the linear tracing procedure works in selecting a pairwise stable network.
The connections model addresses social communication among individuals. Individuals
communicate with those to whom they are linked and receive benefits from both direct and
indirect links. The value from connections to other individuals depends on the shortest distance
to these individuals. Consider a network g ∈ G. If rij is the number of links in the shortest
path between i and j, then the benefits individual i obtains from individual j are given by drij ,
where d ∈ (0, 1) captures the idea that the value from indirect communication is discounted.
The cost of maintaining a link are equal to c for both involved individuals. The payoff of agent








As shown in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), when d − d2 < c < d, a star encompassing
all agents is pairwise stable. Since any agent can be the center of the star, there is multiplicity
of pairwise stable networks. Moreover, other pairwise stable network architectures may co-
exist. It is then of interest to select one particular pairwise stable network via the linear tracing
procedure with a specific prior p.
To illustrate, consider the case n = 3. Figure 1 depicts the eight possible unweighted
networks and Table 1 displays the corresponding payoffs.
Assume d = 0.8 and c = 0.48. Since the condition d − d2 < c < d holds, the stars g4,
g5, and g6 are pairwise stable. There are also pairwise stable weighted networks, which can be
discovered through the linear tracing procedure.
Let the prior be equal to p = (p12, p13, p23) = (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) and consider link 12 at t = 0.
If this link is not formed, then network g0 results with probability 0.02, g2 with probability
0.08, g3 with probability 0.18, and g6 with probability 0.72. The expected payoff for agent 1
is 0.7168 and it is 0.7488 for agent 2. If link 12 is created, then network g1 results with
probability 0.02, g4 with probability 0.08, g5 with probability 0.18, and g7 with probability
12
Figure 1: All unweighted networks with three agents
Table 1: Payoffs vi(g) in the connections model.
g Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3
g0 0 0 0
g1 d− c d− c 0
g2 d− c 0 d− c
g3 0 d− c d− c
g4 2(d− c) d+ d2 − c d+ d2 − c
g5 d+ d2 − c 2(d− c) d+ d2 − c
g6 d+ d2 − c d+ d2 − c 2(d− c)
g7 2(d− c) 2(d− c) 2(d− c)
0.72. The expected payoff for agent 1 is 0.6912 and it is 0.6592 for agent 2. Given these
beliefs, agents 1 and 2 form link 12 with probability 0. It holds that
F 112(0, x−12) = f
1
12(p−12) = 0.6912− 0.7168 = −0.0256,
F 212(0, x−12) = f
2
12(p−12) = 0.6592− 0.7488 = −0.0896,
F12(0, x−12) = min{F 112(0, x−12), F 212(0, x−12)} = −0.0896.
Using analogous calculations, it follows that min{F 113(0, x−13), F 313(0, x−13)} = F 313(0, x−13) <
0 and min{F 223(0, x−23), F 323(0, x−23)} = F 323(0, x−23) > 0.At t = 0 there is a unique pairwise
stable network x ∈ PS(W 0) given by x = (x12, x13, x23) = (0, 0, 1). The only (B1, C1) ∈
B × C for which L (W, p,B1, C1) contains points with t = 0 is given by B1 = {s012, s013, s123}
and C1(12) = 2, C1(13) = 3, and C1(23) = 3, abbreviated as C1 = (2, 3, 3).
We have that
F 313(t, x12, x23) = tf
3
13(x12, x23) + (1− t)f 313(p12, p23)
= t[d− c+ d2x12(1− 2x23)] + (1− t)[d− c+ d2p12(1− 2p23)]
= d− c+ d2[tx12(1− 2x23) + (1− t)p12(1− 2p23)].
Since d = 0.8 and c = 0.48, at x12 = 0 and x23 = 1 the expression above reduces to
F 313(t, 0, 1) = 0.32 + 0.64[(1− t)0.7(−0.8)]
= 0.32(1.12t− 0.12).
Thus, when t = 3/28, F 113 > F
3
13 = 0, and the inequality α13 ≥ 0 in (20) becomes binding.
A further continuation along the path without changing the set B1 makes the value of α13
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negative and thereby violates (20). None of the other inequality constraints becomes binding
before t = 3/28. As long as t ≤ 3
28
, L (W, p,B1, C1) determines the feasible path.
To continue the linear tracing procedure, we expand B1 by adding s113 and define B
2 =
B1∪{s113}. Then, we can trace the arc in Γ(W, p,B2, C1) from (3/28, (0, 0, 1)) to (3/28, (0, 1, 1)).
Further continuation along the path would violate the upper bound of 1 on x13 in inequality
(18). We delete s013 from B
2 by defining B3 = B2 \ {s013} and follow L (W, p,B3, C1) until
t = 1, where we obtain the pairwise stable network x = (0, 1, 1) for the original network
formation problem W . The path generated by the linear tracing procedure is summarized in
Table 2.
Table 2: Tracing procedure via L (W, p,B,C)
t L (W, p,B,C) B C
[0, 3
28
] {(t, (0, 0, 1))|t ∈ [0, 3
28





, (0, x13, 1))|x13 ∈ [0, 1]} {s012, s013, s113, s123} (2,3,3)
[ 3
28
, 1] {(t, (0, 1, 1))|t ∈ [ 3
28
, 1]} {s012, s113, s123} (2,3,3)
The linear tracing procedure connects the pairwise stable network (0, 0, 1) at t = 0 to
the pairwise stable network (0, 1, 1) at t = 1. A natural question is to which networks are
the other pairwise stable stars at t = 1, (1, 0, 1) and (0, 1, 1), connected? It turns out that
they are connected to the pairwise stable networks (0.5, 0.5, 1) and (0.5, 1, 0.5) at t = 1,
respectively. One can easily verify that x = (1, 0.5, 0.5) is also pairwise stable. Through the
arcs in L (W, p), we find that (1, (1, 0.5, 0.5)) is connected to the symmetric pairwise stable






= 0.809 at t = 1. These observations
are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Paths in L (W, p) with p = (0.7, 0.8, 0.9)
t x t x
0 (0, 0, 1) ←→ 1 (0, 1, 1)
1 (0.5, 0.5, 1) ←→ 1 (1, 0, 1)
1 (0.5, 1, 0.5) ←→ 1 (1, 1, 0)
1 (1, 0.5, 0.5) ←→ 1 (0.809, 0.809, 0.809)
In this example, there are seven pairwise stable networks. With prior p = (0.7, 0.8, 0.9),
the linear tracing procedure selects (0, 1, 1), the star centered at agent 3. The other six pairwise
stable networks are pairwise connected.
7 Numerical Implementation
In this section we use the predictor-corrector method to numerically follow the solution path
of the differentiable homotopy of Section 5. We study the connections model with four agents,
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c, i ∈ N, (26)
where wj ∈ R is the social value of agent j.
We assume that the agents have heterogeneous values given by (0.8, 0.9, 1.1, 1.2). As in
Section 6, we take d = 0.8 and c = 0.48. For each ij ∈ L, the distance rij can be computed
by the well-known Dijkstra’s algorithm. We then use the linear tracing procedure with several
different priors. In particular, we consider p1, p2, p3, and p4 given by p1ij = 1 for every ij ∈ L,
p2 = 0.7p1, p3 = 0.5p1, and p4 = 0.3p1.
We represent a network by x = (x12, x13, x14, x23, x24, x34). The best response against prior
p1 is the empty network, (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0). The homotopy path goes from the empty network at
t = 0 to the network (1, 0, 0, 0.7630, 0.7630, 1) at t = 1. With prior p2, the path also starts
from the empty network, but leads to the network (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1), a chain connecting all the
agents. With prior p3, the path starts from (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), the complete network, and leads to
(1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1) as well. With prior p4, the path also starts from the complete network, but leads
to (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0), which is a star centered at agent 2.
The paths resulting from priors p1 and p3 are plotted in Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively,
where the dashed lines indicate the variable t.
Table 4: Paths in H −1({0}) with different priors
Prior PS(W 0) (λ1ij)ij∈L Links formed
1 0 (1,−0.5219,−0.5219, 0.8735, 0.8735, 1) {x12, x23, x24, x34}
0.7 · 1 0 (1,−0.5933,−0.4996, 1,−0.5367, 1) {x12, x23, x34}
0.5 · 1 1 (1,−0.5933,−0.4996, 1,−0.5367, 1) {x12, x23, x34}
0.3 · 1 1 (1,−0.5933,−0.5933, 1, 1,−0.5514) {x12, x23, x24}
We summarize the results obtained by tracing the paths with these priors in Table 4. We use
1 to denote the vector of ones. The outcome selected by the linear tracing procedure depends
on the prior and might even be different if the starting network is the same.
Next, we randomly generate 10 priors and find 8 different pairwise stable networks. Two
of them have non-integer components and all of them are different from the solutions obtained
above. This confirms that as in non-cooperative game theory, the multiplicity of pairwise stable
networks is a serious problem, and that the specific computational method used is of crucial
importance.
8 Conclusion
This paper studies the problem of computing a pairwise stable network as introduced in Bich
and Morhaim (2020), extending work by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). To do so, we first
establish that finding a pairwise stable network is equivalent to finding a Nash equilibrium of a
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Figure 2: Tracing procedure with p1: (λ1ij)ij∈L and t versus iterations.
























Figure 3: Tracing procedure with p3: (λ1ij)ij∈L and t versus iterations.
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game played by the links between every two agents. This allows us to extend the linear tracing
procedure for normal-form games to network formation problems and select one particular
pairwise stable network for any given prior belief. We show that generically the linear tracing
procedure consists of a finite number of piecewise smooth arcs and loops. From this struc-
ture, we can conclude that the linear tracing procedure is well-defined for almost all network
formation problems. As a by-product, it follows that for generic network formation problems
the number of pairwise stable networks is odd, which sharpens the existence result of Bich
and Morhaim (2020). An application of our method to the connections model of Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996) reveals that there are many pairwise stable networks and that the selection of
one particular pairwise stable network depends heavily on the initial beliefs of the agents.
Appendix
Before proving Theorem 3, we need some notations and definitions from the theory of regular
constraint sets as presented in Jongen, Jonker, and Twilt (1983). For some r ≥ 1 a subset
Y of Rm is called a k-dimensional Cr manifold with generalized boundary (MGB), if for
every y ∈ Y there exists a Cr diffeomorphism φ : U → V , where U is an open subset of Rm
containing y and V is open in Rm, and some integer `(y) ≥ 0, such that φ(y) = 0 and φ(U∩Y )
equals {z ∈ V |zi = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m − k, and zi ≥ 0, i = m − k + 1, . . . ,m − k + `(y)}.
If for every element y of an MGB Y it holds that `(y) ≤ 1, then Y is called a manifold with
boundary and the set of elements y for which `(y) = 1 is a (k − 1)-dimensional manifold,
called the boundary of Y.
Let H1 and H2 be two finite index sets and, for all h ∈ H1, let γh and, for all h ∈ H2, ηh
be Cr functions defined on some open subset X of Rm. We define
Y [γ, η] = {y ∈ X|∀h ∈ H1, γh(y) = 0, and, ∀h ∈ H2, ηh(y) ≥ 0}.
For every y ∈ X, we define the set H0(y) = {h ∈ H2|ηh(y) = 0}. If for every y ∈ Y [γ, η] it
holds that
{∂yγh(y)|h ∈ H1} ∪ {∂yηh(y)|h ∈ H0(y)}
is a set of independent vectors, then Y [γ, η] is called a Cr regular constraint set (RCS). In
Jongen, Jonker, and Twilt (1983) it is shown that every Cr RCS is an (m− |H1|)-dimensional
Cr MGB such that, for every y ∈ Y [γ, η], `(y) = |H0(y)|.
Fix a prior p ∈ ∆(G). For every tuple of utility functions v, for every (B,C) ∈ B × C, we
define the functions γB,C,v : R3|L|+1 → R3|L| and ηB,C,v : R3|L|+1 → R3|L|+2 in such a way
that γB,C,v equals the left-hand side of the equalities (10)–(14) and ηB,C,v the left-hand side of
17
the inequalities (16)-(23),
γB,C,v(t, x, α, β) =

F iij(t, x−ij) + αij − βij, ij ∈ L, i ∈ C(ij),












ηB,C,v(t, x, α, β) =

F jij(t, x−ij)− F iij(t, x−ij), ij ∈ L, i ∈ C(ij),
F iij(t, x−ij)− F
j
ij(t, x−ij), ij ∈ L, j ∈ C(ij),












A point (t, x, α, β) ∈ R3|L|+1 is a solution of (10)–(23) if and only if γB,C,v(t, x, α, β) = 0 and
ηB,C,v(t, x, α, β) ≥ 0.
For every (B,C) ∈ B × C, we define the functions γB,C : R3|L|+1 × Rn2|L| → R3|L| and
ηB,C : R3|L|+1 × Rn2|L| → R3|L|+2 by specifying, for every (t, x, α, β, v) ∈ R3|L|+1 × Rn2|L| ,
γB,C(t, x, α, β, v) = γB,C,v(t, x, α, β) and ηB,C(t, x, α, β, v) = ηB,C,v(t, x, α, β). For con-
venience, we write γB,C = (γB,C1 , . . . , γ
B,C




1,ij )ij∈L, i∈C(ij), γ
B,C
2 =












5,ij )s0ij∈B, and γ
B,C
6 =
(γB,C6,ij )s1ij∈B. We use analogous notational conventions for the functions γ
B,C,v, ηB,C , and
ηB,C,v. The set of all indices related to γB,C as well as γB,C,v is denoted by H1,B,C . The set of
all indices related to ηB,C as well as ηB,C,v is denoted by H2,B,C .
The structure of the proof of Theorem 3 is as follows. First, it is shown that for almost
every v ∈ Rn2|L| , for every (B,C) ∈ B × C, Y [γB,C,v, ηB,c,v] is a regular constraint set by
showing that for every y ∈ Y [γB,C,v, ηB,C,v],
{∂yγB,C,vh (y)|h ∈ H
1,B,C} ∪ {∂yηB,C,vh (y)|h ∈ H
0,B,C(y)}
is a set of independent vectors. Lemma 2 is used to handle points y for which H0,B,C(y) = ∅,
Lemma 3 deals with points y such that the cardinality of H0,B,C(y) is one, and Lemma 4
implies that generically H0,B,C(y) contains at most one element. Let the symbol t> denote
transversal intersection.
Lemma 2. Let p ∈ ∆(G) and (B,C) ∈ B × C. Then, for almost every v ∈ Rn2|L| , it holds
that γB,C,vt>{0}.
Proof. Let y = (t, x, α, β, v) ∈ R3|L|+1 × Rn2|L| be such that γB,C(y) = 0.











has full row rank. Let ij ∈ L be such that i ∈ C(ij). We have that
∂vγ
B,C




















{g∈G|gij=0}[tπg−ij(x−ij) + (1− t)πg−ij(p−ij)]v
i(g).
Let g ∈ G be such that gij = 1. It holds that
∂vi(g)γ
B,C
1,ij (y) = tπg−ij(x−ij) + (1− t)πg−ij(p−ij).
Let g ∈ G be such that gij = 0. It holds that
∂vi(g)γ
B,C
1,ij (y) = −tπg−ij(x−ij)− (1− t)πg−ij(p−ij).
Let mij ∈ Rn2|L| be the vector such that mijk,g = 1 if k = i and gij = 1, and m
ij
k,g = 0






{g∈G|gij=1}[tπg−ij(x−ij) + (1− t)πg−ij(p−ij)]
= t
∑
{g∈G|gij=1} πg−ij(x−ij) + (1− t)
∑
{g∈G|gij=1} πg−ij(p−ij)
= t+ 1− t = 1.






{g∈G|gij=1 and gik=1}[tπg−ik(x−ik) + (1− t)πg−ik(p−ik)]
−
∑
{g∈G|gij=1 and gik=0}[tπg−ik(x−ik) + (1− t)πg−ik(p−ik)]
=
∑
{g∈G|gij=1}[tπg−ik(x−ik) + (1− t)πg−ik(p−ik)
−tπg−ik(x−ik)− (1− t)πg−ik(p−ik)]
= 0.









1,k` (y) = 0,
where the last equality follows from k 6= i. It follows by symmetry that, for every k` ∈ L such





Now let ij ∈ L be such that j ∈ C(ij). Let mij ∈ Rn2|L| be the vector such that mijk,g = 1
if k = j and gij = 1, and m
ij
















ij = 0, k` ∈ L, k ∈ C(k`).
Let M be the n2|L|×|L|-matrix with columns equal to (mij)ij∈L, i∈C(ij) and (mij)ij∈L, j∈C(ij).
Our derivations show that
PM = I,
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where I is the |L| × |L| identity matrix. Since M is a right-inverse of P, we have shown that
P has full row rank.
Let z ∈ R3|L|+1 be such that z>∂yγB,C(y) = 0. Since P has full row rank and ∂vγB,C3 (y),
. . . , ∂vγ
B,C






by ∂x̃. We have that
z>∂x̃γ
B,C(y) = z>3 ∂x̃γ
B,C




















= (z>3 , z
>
4 )I = 0,
where the first equality follows from z1 = 0 and z2 = 0 and the second equality since γ
B,C
5
and γB,C6 do not involve x. Since I is the (2|L| − |B|)× (2|L| − |B|) identity matrix, we have




by ∂β̃. We have that
z>∂β̃γ
B,C(y) = z>5 ∂β̃γ
B,C








= z>5 I = 0,
where I is the k × k identity matrix with k the cardinality of the set {ij ∈ L | s0ij ∈ B}. It




by ∂α̃. We have
z>∂α̃γ
B,C(y) = z>6 ∂α̃γ
B,C
6 (y)
= z>6 I = 0,
where I is the k × k identity matrix with k the cardinality of the set {ij ∈ L | s1ij ∈ B}. It
follows that z6 = 0.
We have shown that z>∂yγB,C(y) = 0 implies z = 0, so ∂yγB,C(y) has full row rank, and
therefore γB,Ct>{0}.
By the transversality theorem, see Mas-Colell (1985), Theorem I.2.2, and since γB,C is
a C∞ function, it follows that the complement of {v ∈ Rn2|L| |γB,C,vt>{0}} has Lebesgue
measure zero.
Lemma 3. Let p ∈ ∆(G), (B,C) ∈ B×C, and h ∈ H2,B,C . Then, for almost every v ∈ Rn2|L| ,
it holds that (γB,C,v, ηB,C,vh )t>{0}.
Proof. Let y = (t, x, α, β, v) ∈ R3|L|+1 × Rn2|L| be such that γB,C(y) = 0 and ηB,Ch (y) = 0.
We show that the matrix of partial derivatives of (γB,C , ηB,Ch ) at y has full row rank.
Consider the case where h = (1, ij) for ij ∈ L such that i ∈ C(ij). Let eij ∈ Rn2|L|
be the vector such that eijk,g = 1 if k = j and gij = 1, and e
ij
k,g = 0 otherwise. Using the
same arguments as in Lemma 2, it follows that ∂vγ
B,C
1 (y)e
ij = 0 and ∂vγ
B,C
2 (y)e
ij = 0. Also,














ij − ∂vF iij(t, x−ij)mij = −1.
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For any other column m of the matrix M, we have ∂vη
B,C




 [ M eij ] = [ I 0
0 · · · 0− 1 0 · · · 0 1
]
.
Since the matrix on the right-hand size has full rank, we can proceed as in Lemma 2 and
conclude that the matrix of partial derivatives of (γB,C , ηB,Ch ) at y has full row rank.
The same argument applies if h = (2, ij) for ij ∈ L such that j ∈ C(ij).
Consider h = (3, ij), so 1− xij = 0 and s0ij ∈ B. It follows that s1ij ∈ B, since otherwise
(12) implies xij = 0, leading to a contradiction with 1− xij = 0. Similarly, if h = (4, ij), we










The rest of the argument is identical to the one in the proof of Lemma 2.
Consider h = (5, ij), so s1ij /∈ B. Denote ∂(αk`)s1
k`
∈B ,αij









The rest of the argument is identical to the one in the proof of Lemma 2.
Consider h = (6, ij), so s0ij /∈ B. Denote ∂(βk`)s0
k`
∈B ,βij









The rest of the argument is identical to the one in the proof of Lemma 2.
Consider h = 7. We start the argument as in the proof of Lemma 2 and complete it by the
observation that ∂tη
B,C




We have shown that (γB,C , ηB,Ch )t>{0}. By the transversality theorem it follows that the
complement of {v ∈ Rn2|L| |(γB,C,v, ηB,C,vh )t>{0}} has Lebesgue measure zero.
Lemma 4. Let p ∈ ∆(G), (B,C) ∈ B × C, and h, h′ ∈ H2,B,C with h 6= h′. Then, for almost
every v ∈ Rn2|L| , it holds that (γB,C,v, ηB,C,vh , η
B,C,v
h′ )t>{0}.
Proof. Let y = (t, x, α, β, v) ∈ R3|L|+1 × Rn2|L| be such that γB,C(y) = 0, ηB,Ch (y) = 0, and
ηB,Ch′ (y) = 0. We show that the matrix of partial derivatives of (γ
B,C , ηB,Ch , η
B,C
h′ ) at y has full
row rank.
Consider the case where h = (1, ij) for ij ∈ L such that i ∈ C(ij) and h′ = (1, i′j′) for
i′j′ ∈ L such that i′ ∈ C(i′j′). Let ei′j′ ∈ Rn2|L| be the vector such that ei
′j′
k,g = 1 if k = i
′ and
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gi′j′ = 1, and e
i′j′













 [ M eij ei′j′ ] =
 I 0 00 · · · 0− 1 0 · · · 0 · · · 0 1 0
0 · · · 0 · · · 0− 1 0 · · · 0 0 1
 .
Since the matrix on the right-hand size has full rank, we can proceed as in Lemma 3 to show
that the matrix of partial derivatives of (γB,C , ηB,Ch , η
B,C
h′ ) at y has full row rank.
The case where h = (1, ij) for ij ∈ L such that i ∈ C(ij) and h′ = (1, i′j′) for i′j′ ∈ L
such that j′ ∈ C(i′j′) as well as the case where h = (1, ij) for ij ∈ L such that j ∈ C(ij)
and h′ = (1, i′j′) for i′j′ ∈ L such that j′ ∈ C(i′j′) follow similarly. All other cases can be
handled as in the proof of Lemma 3, except the case h = 7 and h′ = 8. However, that case
implies t = 0 and −t+ 1 = 0, so cannot occur.
We have shown that (γB,C , ηB,Ch , η
B,C
h′ )t>{0}. By the transversality theorem it follows that
the complement of {v ∈ Rn2|L||(γB,C,v, ηB,C,vh )t>{0}} has Lebesgue measure zero.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3.
Proof. Fix a prior p ∈ ∆(G) and a pair (B,C) ∈ B × C. The set V consisting of v ∈ Rn2|L|
such that γB,C,vt>{0}, for every h ∈ H2,B,C , (γB,C,v, ηB,C,vh )t>{0}, and for every h, h′ ∈ H2,B,C
with h 6= h′, (γB,C,v, ηB,C,vh , η
B,C,v
h′ )t>{0} has full Lebesgue measure by Lemmas 2, 3, and 4.
Consider any v ∈ V. We show that Y [γB,C,v, ηB,C,v] is a regular constraint set. Consider
any y ∈ Y [γB,C,v, ηB,C,v]. It has to be shown that
{∂yγB,C,vh (y)|h ∈ H
1,B,C} ∪ {∂yηB,C,vh (y)|h ∈ H
0,B,C(y)}
is a set of independent vectors. This is a consequence of Lemma 2 when H0(y) = ∅ and a
consequence of Lemma 3 when |H0(y)| = 1. Suppose |H0(y)| ≥ 2 and choose two elements,
say h and h′, from H0(y). It follows from Lemma 4 that
{∂yγB,C,vh (y)|h ∈ H
1,B,C} ∪ {∂yηB,C,vh (y), ∂yη
B,C,v
h′ (y)}
is a set of independent vectors, which leads to a contradiction as the set contains 3|L| + 2
vectors of dimension 3|L| + 1. Consequently, |H0(y)| ≤ 1, and Y [γB,C,v, ηB,C,v] is a regular
constraint set.
It follows that O(W, p,B,C) is a 1-dimensional manifold with boundary and that the
boundary of O(W, p,B,C) is given by the elements y ∈ Y [γB,C,v, ηB,C,v] with |H0,B,C(y)| =
1. Therefore, a point in O(W, p,B,C) is a boundary point if and only if exactly one of the
inequalities in (16)-(23) holds with equality. These properties carry over to L (W, p,B,C)
since it is diffeomorphic to O(W, p,B,C) by Theorem 2.
If the inequality xij ≥ 0 (respectively, xij ≤ 1) is binding, it holds that xij = 0 (respec-
tively, xij = 1) and this boundary point is also a boundary point of L (W, p,B′, C), where
B′ = B\{s1ij} (respectively, B′ = B\{s0ij}). If the inequality αij ≥ 0 (respectively, βij ≥ 0)
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is binding, it holds that αij = 0 (respectively, βij = 0) and this boundary point is also a bound-
ary point of L (W, p,B′, C), whereB′ = B∪{s1ij} (respectively,B′ = B∪{s0ij}). Alternative
(i) holds.
If the inequality F jij(t, x−ij) − F iij(t, x−ij) ≥ 0 is binding, this boundary point is also a
boundary point of L (W, p,B,C ′), where C ′(ij) = j and C ′ coincides with C otherwise. If
the inequality F jij(t, x−ij)−F iij(t, x−ij) ≥ 0 is binding, this boundary point is also a boundary
point of L (W, p,B,C ′), where C ′(ij) = i and C ′ coincides with C otherwise. Alternative
(ii) holds.
If the binding inequality is t ≥ 0 or −t+ 1 ≥ 0, then alternative (iii) holds.
Compactness of L (W, p,B,C) is obvious.
It remains to be shown that there is an open set of network formation problems and priors
with full Lebesgue measure for which the asserted properties hold. Let Q be the set Rn2|L| ×
∆(G) of all network formation problems and priors and, for every (B,C) ∈ B×C, letQB,C be
the subset ofQ consisting of all pairs (v, p) for which the transversality statements in Lemma 2,
Lemma 3, and Lemma 4 hold. It has already been shown that Q\QB,C has Lebesgue measure
zero. If (v, p) ∈ Q\QB,C , then there exists y = (t, x, α, β) ∈ R3|L|+1 such that (v, p, y)
belongs to the set RB,C which is defined as the union of the sets{
(v, p, y) ∈ Q× R3|L|+1
∣∣γB,C,v,p(y) = 0 and rank(∂yγB,C,v,p(y)) ≤ 3|L| − 1},{
(v, p, y) ∈ Q× R3|L|+1











, h ∈ H2,B,C{
(v, p, y) ∈ Q× R3|L|+1






 ≤ 3|L|+ 1}, h, h′ ∈ H2,B,C , h 6= h′.
The notation γB,C,v,p and ηB,C,v,p makes the dependence on the prior p explicit. The set RB,C
is closed since it is obtained by finite unions and intersections of closed sets. We define the
projection q : RB,C → Q by
q(v, p, y) = (v, p), (v, p, y) ∈ RB,C .
It holds that q(RB,C) = Q\QB,C . We show that q is proper, i.e., that q−1(K) is compact if
K is a compact subset of Q. Let K be a compact subset of Q. Clearly, q−1(K) is a closed
subset of the set RB,C , which is easily seen to be bounded, and therefore q−1(K) is compact.
Since the image by a continuous proper mapping of a closed set is closed, it follows that
q(RB,C) = Q \ QB,C is closed, so QB,C is open. Since there is a finite number of pairs
(B,C) ∈ B × C, the intersection of the sets QB,C over all (B,C) ∈ B × C is an open set of
full Lebesgue measure of games and priors with the properties as stated in the theorem.
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